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The policing response to rising protest action in the country has received increased attention in the 
last decade. This is particularly owing to concerns over confrontations during which protesters have 
been arrested, injured and in some instances killed by the police. Despite the criticism voiced by 
various stakeholders about the manner in which the police manage crowd gatherings, relatively little 
is known about the views of South African adults on the policing of protest action and the factors that 
shape such attitudes. To provide some insight, this article draws on data from a specialised module 
on protest-related attitudes and behaviour that was fielded as part of the 2016 round of the Human 
Sciences Research Council’s South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) series. This nationally 
representative survey included specific questions probing the public’s overall evaluation of the 
performance of the police in dealing with protests, and the justifiability of the use of force in policing 
protest action. The article will present a national picture of people’s views on the policing of protest, 
based on these measures, and then determine the extent to which there are distinct underlying 
socio-demographic cleavages in these data. A combination of bivariate and multivariate analysis 
is undertaken in order to understand how perceptions of effectiveness, acceptability and reported 
participation in protest (especially disruptive and violent actions) shape people’s views regarding 
policing of protest. The article concludes with a discussion that reflects on the implications of the 
research for the policing of protest action in future, given the appreciable rise in the incidence of 
protest since the mid-2000s and the mounting tensions between state institutions and communities 
over the political, moral and constitutional arguments for and against such actions.  
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The media and commentators have often 
referred to South Africa as ‘the protest 
capital of the world’.1 Indeed, the country has 
experienced a considerable increase in protest 
activity in the last 10 years, some of which has 
been quite violent.2 The manner in which these 
protests have been handled from a policing 
perspective has placed law enforcement in 
South Africa under appreciable public scrutiny.3 
Crowd control of these protests by police and 
in particular the Public Order Police (POP) units 
has been called into question by academics 
as well as civil society.4 The death of Andries 
Tatane, who subsequently became a symbol 
of inadequate policing during protests, has 
regularly been cited as an example of police 
failure in this area. The August 2012 Marikana 
massacre also highlights the failure of policing 
during protests, and the lack of response from 
government.5 Despite the criticism voiced 
by civil society and other stakeholders about 
the manner in which the police control crowd 
gatherings, relatively little is known about South 
Africans’ views on the policing of protest action 
and the factors that shape such attitudes. To 
provide some insight, this article draws on 
recent nationally representative public opinion 
data to examine attitudes about the policing of 
protest action. 
The violent treatment of protesters at the hands 
of police officers is not a recent aberration but 
dates back to the apartheid era.6 The General 
Law Amendment Act 37 of 1963 and the 
Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 96 (180-
Day Detention Law) of 1965 gave the South 
African Police (SAP) the power to arrest anyone 
suspected of acting against the state and hold 
them without charge for 90 days.7 These laws 
were used to suppress protests and arrest 
protesters. SAP officers often lacked proper 
crowd control training and were deployed to 
suppress public protests armed with shotguns, 
bullwhips and batons.8 The result was brutal 
and violent. Perhaps the most tragic example 
is the 1960 Sharpeville massacre, when police 
fired live rounds into a crowd of between 
5 000 and 7 000 protesters, killing 69 and 
injuring hundreds. Similar incidents occurred 
in 1976 during the Soweto uprising as well as 
in Uitenhage in 1985, when 20 people were 
killed.9 During the apartheid period, the policing 
of protest action ‘ensured that sustained 
brutality’ was a dominant feature of a ‘black 
South African experience’.10 One notable 
outcome of this history of authoritarian policing 
is a deep-seated lack of public confidence in 
the legitimacy of the police.11
With the transition to democracy in the early 
1990s, the new government sought to restore 
public confidence in the authorities’ ability to 
manage protests. Legislation, including the 
South African Police Service Act of 1995 and 
the Regulation of Gatherings Act of 1993, was 
introduced to reform how the police handled 
crowd control. The fragmented policing service 
that apartheid spatial planning had produced 
was swept away and a single, centralised South 
African Police Service (SAPS) was created. 
A new organisational transformation agenda 
aimed to alter ‘police cultures, structure and 
symbols’, and brought new emphasis on a 
community policing model.12 Unlike the former 
SAP, the new SAPS would no longer suppress 
popular will, but would work with communities 
to maintain order and law.13 POP units were 
created in 1996 to ensure prudent and 
judicious crowd control.14 In keeping with these 
commitments, the country became a member 
of the Peace and Security Council, which is an 
African Union organ concerned with stability 
and the resolution of conflict in Africa.15 
In 2002, POP units were restructured into Area 
Crime Combating Units (ACCUs), reflecting a 
strategic shift in focus from crowd management 
policing to crime reduction.16 POP units were 
further restructured in 2006 with the number 
of units cut from 43 in 2002 to 23; thereby 
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significantly reducing the number of dedicated 
POP members.17 The restructuring of public 
order policing functions coincided with an 
increase in the number of crowd management 
incidents the ACCUs/POP units had to 
respond to, and the restructuring thus had a 
negative impact on the police’s ability to deal 
with protest.18 This has placed a considerable 
burden on existing police resources and there 
has been an attempt to strengthen POP units 
by increasing the number of dedicated, trained 
POP officers and the number of POP units. In 
2014 the SAPS reported that POP had 28 units 
and 4 175 officers, and requested R3.3 billion 
for further expansion.19 The government aims 
to employ 11 800 POP officers by 2020.20 
The capacity of the SAPS to perform its 
crowd management duties is undermined by 
negative public sentiment towards the police. 
A small body of scholarship has attempted 
to understand antipathy towards the police 
in spite of the considerable policy change 
and experimentation post-1994. International 
scholarship on legitimacy and procedural 
justice has tended to demonstrate that 
public judgments about police fairness and 
effectiveness have a considerable influence 
on an individual’s overall evaluations of police 
legitimacy.21 A number of recent studies have 
raised concern about the fairness with which 
the police treat ordinary South Africans.22 
Existing research suggests that trust in the 
police is low, which undermines the legitimacy 
of this important institution.23 
Despite the widespread policing reforms since 
1994, many challenges exist in relation to 
police legitimacy in present-day South Africa. 
The police’s role during apartheid likely weighs 
heavily in evaluations of present-day policing 
for many people, and the resurgence of para-
militarism in policing practices, such as the 
deployment of Tactical Response Team (TRT) 
units at Marikana, likely produces ambivalent 
public responses. The use of excessive 
and lethal force, mounting issues of police 
corruption, lingering concerns over fair and 
equal treatment, as well as the perception 
of police incompetence in the face of high 
crime rates, further complicate the picture. 
This has resulted in a remarkable turn towards 
various forms of non-state policing,24 including 
vigilantism, which in turn is likely to inform 
perceptions of police legitimacy. These factors 
have resulted in increasing calls for a form 
of minimalist policing in which police activity 
focuses on more effectively performing core 
functions such as criminal investigation and 
emergency response, with non-state actors 
taking strong roles in everyday policing and 
crime prevention.25
From an international perspective, it was not 
until the late 1980s and 1990s that the policing 
of protest became a subject of substantive 
interest within the social sciences, with early 
survey-based and qualitative research focusing 
on the repression of protest and on police 
actions in maintaining public order.26 In 1998 
the concept of ‘protest policing’ was formally 
introduced through the influential volume 
edited by Donatella della Porta and Herbert 
Reiter titled Policing protest: the control of 
demonstrations in Western democracies. 
Defined simply as ‘the police handling of 
protest events’, protest policing within 
democratic societies was portrayed as involving 
a fine balance between protecting public law 
and order and defending individual freedoms 
and the citizen right to political participation 
and demonstration.27 The latter rights are 
regarded as quintessential elements of liberal 
democracy; consequently, the style of policing 
adopted in controlling protest, which has the 
potential to either polarise or win the favour of 
majoritarian public opinion, has come to receive 
much academic and policy scrutiny. The public 
order literature has charted how approaches 
to protest policing have evolved over the 
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decades, from what was characteristically 
referred to as an ‘escalated force’ model, which 
predominated in the 1960s, to a ‘negotiated 
management’ approach in the 1980s and 
1990s. The former involved a general disregard 
for the constitutional right to demonstrate 
and a failure to issue protest permits, 
tolerance only of ‘comfortable’ (most peaceful) 
forms of protest, nominal police–protester 
communication, a predisposition for forceful 
arrest of perceived agitators, and the use of 
force as a standard protest control method.28 
By contrast, negotiated management entails 
respect for civic rights, tolerance of a certain 
level of disruptive behaviour, a strong emphasis 
on communication, reliance on arrests as a last 
resort, and adherence to minimum necessary 
force.29 Although there is recognition that the 
policing of protest has become less violent in 
Western democracies in recent decades with 
the rise of a softer, more tolerant and flexible 
approach, there are rising concerns that the 
pendulum may have begun to swing again 
towards repressive tendencies in the face of 
transnational, anti-globalisation protests and as 
a mounting response to terrorist threats.30 This, 
in turn, has led to renewed attention to the style 
of and explanations for protest policing. 
In what remains the most widely applied 
theoretical model explaining styles of protest 
policing, Della Porter and Reiter argue that 
the prevailing approach to police handling 
of protest is informed by a two-tiered set of 
factors.31 At the first level, these determinants 
include: (1) the organisational structure and 
culture of policing, including the extent of 
police discretionary powers and the protest-
related stereotypes they hold; (2) the political 
context and culture of a country, including 
dominant norms about the role of the state 
and citizen rights; (3) public opinion and 
interests expressed by various collective actors, 
including government, social movements, 
political parties, trade unions, interest groups, 
civil society organisations and the media; 
and (4) the actual experiences of interaction 
between police and protesters.32 The extent 
and nature of the impact of these factors 
on protest policing approaches is ultimately 
mediated by their level of influence, at the 
second tier, on ‘police knowledge’. This 
refers to the police’s perceptions of external 
reality, both at the individual officer level and 
collectively. What is of particular theoretical 
relevance for this article is that public opinion 
is acknowledged as having a potential 
influence on trends in protest policing 
practice. However, this influence is conditional 
on such public preferences reaching and 
changing the way the police view the 
context into which they are sent to maintain 
public order. People’s understanding of and 
response to protest dynamics are also likely 
to be informed by the media, which publishes 
and popularises the preferences of influential 
opinion leaders such as government, political 
parties and lobby groups. This, taken together 
with broader contextual events, may lead 
to a demand for either tougher or softer 
interventions in policing protest. 
The next section of the article provides an 
outline of the survey data and measures used 
in our study. This leads into a presentation 
of our findings, which is structured in three 
parts. Firstly, we examine the extent to which 
the public on average expresses confidence 
in the way protest is being policed, and 
determine the extent to which distinct socio-
demographic differences in perspective 
exist. Secondly, we cast attention on the 
use of force by police in managing protests 
in the country, focusing in particular on the 
perceived justifiability of such behaviour. 
Finally, we conduct multivariate regression 
analysis to discern which factors influence 
individual evaluations of the policing of 
protest. This analysis aims to provide an 
understanding of how various elements shape 
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opinions regarding the policing of protest: 
the role of basic socio-demographic factors, 
the perceived effectiveness and acceptability 
of protest, reported participation in protest, 
as well as views on use of force and general 
trust in the police. The article concludes with 
a discussion that reflects on the implications 
of the survey results for the policing of protest 
action in future.
Methodology
Data
This study employs quantitative data from 
the 2016 round of the SASAS, a repeat 
cross-sectional survey series that has been 
conducted annually since 2003 by the Human 
Sciences Research Council (HSRC). Each 
SASAS round has been designed to yield 
a nationally representative sample of adults 
aged 16 and older living in private residences. 
Statistics South Africa’s 2011 Population 
Census Small Area Layers (SALs) were used 
as primary sampling units (PSUs). For each 
round of SASAS, 500 PSUs are drawn, 
with probability proportional to size, from a 
sampling frame containing all of the 
2011 SALs.33 
In each of these drawn PSUs, 21 dwelling 
units were selected and systematically 
grouped into three sub-samples of seven, 
each corresponding to the three SASAS 
questionnaire versions that are fielded. 
The relevant protest action questions were 
included in only one of the three instruments, 
and thus administered to seven visiting 
points in each PSU.34 The sample size of the 
study consisted of 3 079 interviews, which is 
equivalent to an 88% response rate. 
The English base version of the research 
instruments was translated into the country’s 
major official languages and the surveys were 
administered in the preferred language of 
the respondent. This was to ensure that all 
respondents in different provinces understood 
the questionnaire and that it was culturally 
equivalent and consistent across all languages. 
Pilot testing was conducted in an attempt to 
ensure the validity of the research instrument. 
Interviews were conducted by means of face-to-
face interviewing, using print questionnaires.35 
Measures on the policing of protest 
The 2016 SASAS round included a specialised 
module on protest-related attitudes and 
behaviour. This was designed in conjunction 
with the University of Johannesburg’s Centre 
for Social Change. The module included two 
items that address the policing of protest action 
in the country. The first measure addresses the 
perceived effectiveness with which the police 
are dealing with protest action. Specifically, 
respondents were asked: ‘In your opinion, how 
well are the police dealing with protests in South 
Africa?’ Responses were captured using a four-
point scale, with the coded options labelled as 
‘very well’, ‘fairly well’, ‘not very well’, and ‘not 
at all well’. The second survey measure deals 
with the perceived legitimacy of the use of force 
by the police in responding to protests. The 
question was introduced with an explanation of 
use of force, followed by an example aimed to 
elicit a clear response by the public on whether 
they regard such police action as justifiable 
or not. The specific phrasing of the question 
is as follows: ‘There are different views on the 
use of force by police during protest action. By 
force we mean the use of rubber bullets, stun 
grenades, tear gas and water cannons by the 
police. Please say whether the use of force by 
the police against protesters who throw stones 
at them is justified in all cases, is justified in 
some cases, or is never justified.’ 
Police performance in handling 
protest action
From Figure 1 it is apparent that barely a third 
(37%) of South Africans consider the police to 
be performing ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ well in handling 
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protests in the country.36 By contrast, a majority 
(60%) believe that the police are faring poorly 
in their response to protest, with 35% stating 
they are not performing very well and a further 
25% saying they are not performing well at all. 
The remaining 3% were uncertain as to how to 
evaluate this form of policing. 
To better understand whether the South African 
public holds relatively uniform or discrepant 
views in relation to the policing of protest 
action, we examined the nature and extent 
of variance in perspective, based on various 
socio-demographic attributes. The findings 
show that there were no statistically significant 
differences in evaluation based on age, gender, 
race, marital status, educational attainment, 
employment status or standard of living level. 
Employment status has a modest effect, with 
unemployed adults providing more critical views 
than pensioners and others who were labour 
inactive.37 This suggests that demographic 
variables do not exert much influence over how 
the public views the way in which protest action 
is being policed in the country, and points to a 
fairly broad level of consistency in attitude. 
There is, however, notable spatial variation 
underlying the national average. In terms of 
type of geographic location, we find that those 
residing in informal urban settlements tend to 
offer harsher views on police performance in 
handling protests than those based in formal 
urban areas, rural traditional authority areas and 
on rural farms. Provincially, those in Limpopo 
and the Northern Cape provide less critical 
assessments of the effectiveness of the policing 
of protest, although even in these instances 
the public remains quite ambivalent, with 
virtually equal shares adopting favourable and 
unfavourable positions. At the other extreme, 
the most negative evaluation comes from 
residents in the North West province, where 
approximately three-quarters (74%) indicated 
that the police were faring poorly in dealing with 
protest action. Unfortunately, given the absence 
of trend data on the measure, we cannot 
determine the extent to which this has been 
informed by events in Marikana five years ago, 
or as a result of other deaths that have occurred 
during protest in the North West, such as the 
water protests in Mothutlung that resulted in the 
death of four people. It is, however, plausible 
that these tragic events may have had an 
indelible effect on attitudes towards public order 
policing and the police more generally in the 
province. Bivariate testing reveals that those 
living in the North West, Gauteng and KwaZulu-
Natal are more negative in outlook than those in 
Limpopo and the Northern Cape.38 
Figure 1: Evaluation of the effectiveness of the policing of protest, 2016 (%, n=2989)
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3
Source: HSRC South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) 2016.
Note: The vertical lines represent the 95% confidence intervals for each point estimate.
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Table 1: Spatial differences in the evaluations of how the police are handling protest action, 2016 
  (percentages and mean scores)
Percentage: 
‘very’ or 
‘fairly’ well
Percentage: 
‘not very well’ or 
‘not at all well’
Mean score
(0–3 scale)
Unweighted base 
N with/without 
‘don’t know’ 
values
National average 37 60 1.19 2 989 / 2 871
Geographic type
Urban formal 36 60 1.20 2 068 / 1 978
Informal 
settlements
26 68 0.91 206 / 196
Rural traditional 
authority areas
41 58 1.29 555 / 544
Rural farms 47 44 1.39 160 / 153
Province
Western Cape 35 61 1.17 393 / 373
Eastern Cape 44 56 1.24 424 / 422
Northern Cape 47 48 1.44 219 / 214
Free State 38 57 1.29 207 / 192
KwaZulu-Natal 32 66 1.13 561 / 551
North West 20 74 0.99 214 / 204
Gauteng 37 62 1.13 449 / 431
Mpumalanga 35 51 1.19 242 / 208
Limpopo 48 51 1.49 280 / 276
Source: HSRC South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) 2016.
Note:  The mean scores are based on a reversed scale, where 0=’not at all well’ and 3=’very well’. ‘Do not know’ responses are not presented in the table. The unweighted   
 base number of observations are included in the final column based on the distributions with and without ‘don’t know’ responses included. The percentages in the table  
 are based on the former, and the mean scores the latter. 
The justifiability of using 
force in policing protest
The use of force in the context of policing 
protest in the country has received increased 
attention over the last decade. This has been 
prompted in particular by specific high-profile 
events, including the killing of Andries Tatane 
and the Marikana massacre, as well as the 
manner in which the #FeesMustFall protests 
were handled. This raises the question as 
to whether the public favours or rejects the 
kinds of displays of force that have become 
an increasingly common response by public 
order police in cases of violent protest. In Figure 
2 we present the national distribution, based 
on the measure regarding public views on the 
use of force in policing protest. Slightly more 
than a tenth (13%) regard a forceful policing 
response as unequivocally justifiable, with close 
to half of South Africans seeing such action as 
acceptable in certain instances. Only around 
a third (35%) expressly rejected the use of 
force in responding to protests, with a nominal 
share remaining uncertain in their views on this 
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matter. This is quite a disconcerting finding, 
as it seems to suggest that the public has 
an appetite for a strong policing response (at 
least in certain contextual circumstances) in 
dealing with more violent forms of protest. It 
does nonetheless resonate with the public 
preferences about how criminality ought to 
be dealt with in general, which tends towards 
a demand for punitive actions.39 It is again 
important to understand how widely this 
general predisposition is shared among the 
adult public before we return to the issue of 
how this and other factors inform confidence in 
the policing of protest more broadly. 
At the subgroup level, we find no significant 
differences in views on the use of force based 
on age, gender, educational attainment, 
employment status, marital status, or standard 
of living level. There are, however, notable 
population group and geographic differences 
that are apparent, as presented in Table 2. The 
findings show that white adults and, to a lesser 
extent, coloured adults are more inclined to 
favour the use of force than black African and 
Indian adults. The main basis of this distinction 
is due to a greater tendency among white and 
coloured adults to respond that the use of 
force is ‘sometimes justifiable’, while the opposite 
pattern is true in relation to the ‘never justifiable’ 
category. There is no significant variation in the 
shares responding ‘always justifiable’, though 
Indian adults were more likely to voice uncertainty 
(15% compared to 5–8% for the rest). Despite 
these differences, the predominant response in 
all cases is that police use of force is viewed as 
warranted in certain circumstances, even if the 
degree of support for this option varies.
The observed differences with respect to type of 
geographic location are only barely statistically 
significant. Those residing in informal urban 
settlements were less likely than formal urban 
dwellers to respond that the use of force is 
‘sometimes justifiable’, while conversely, those in 
informal settlements were more likely to respond 
that it is ‘never justifiable’ than were those in 
formal urban areas. Those living on rural farms 
displayed greater uncertainty than those in 
informal settlements and rural traditional 
authority areas. 
What factors influence evaluations 
of the policing of protest?
Apart from the descriptive analysis outlined 
above, we also conducted regression analysis 
Figure 2: Views on the use of force in policing protest action, 2016 (%, n=2989)
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Source: HSRC South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) 2016.
Note: The vertical lines represent the 95% confidence intervals for each point estimate.
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Table 2: Significant differences in views on the use of force in policing protest, 2016 (percentages)
Always 
justifiable
Sometimes 
justifiable
Never 
justifiable
(Do not 
know)
Total Unweighted 
base N
% Always / 
sometimes
National average 13 47 35 5 100 2 989 60
Population group
Black African 13 45 38 5 100 1 795 57
Coloured 11 53 28 8 100 468 64
Indian / Asian 10 45 31 14 100 353 55
White 17 59 19 5 100 373 76
Geographic type
Urban formal 13 48 32 7 100 2 067 61
Informal 
settlements
14 38 45 3 100 207 52
Rural traditional 
authority areas
13 47 37 2 100 554 60
Rural farms 7 50 33 10 100 161 57
Province
Western Cape 7 57 30 7 100 393 63
Eastern Cape 11 59 31 0 100 422 69
Northern Cape 18 50 25 7 100 220 68
Free State 21 41 24 14 100 206 62
KwaZulu-Natal 11 51 35 3 100 568 62
North West 9 44 37 9 100 211 54
Gauteng 14 42 40 4 100 447 56
Mpumalanga 21 31 32 16 100 242 52
Limpopo 14 40 44 2 100 280 54
Source: HSRC South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) 2016.
to provide a clearer sense of the significant 
predictors of public evaluations of the 
effectiveness of the policing of protest. In so 
doing, we aimed to ascertain whether the 
statistically significant findings identified earlier 
remained when we combined the variables 
into the multivariate models. Given that the 
dependent variable is an ordered categorical 
measure, we used ordered logistic regression 
techniques. For ease of interpretation, we 
reversed the scaling of the variable, so that a 
value of ‘0’ was assigned to those reporting that 
the police are faring ‘not at all well’ in dealing 
with protest, a score of ‘1’ to those answering 
‘not very well’, ‘2’ to those ‘fairly well’, and 
lastly a value of ‘3’ to those responding that the 
police are doing ‘very well’. A series of models 
was then generated, as presented in Table 3. 
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We begin with a base model containing only the 
socio-demographic attributes of respondents 
(Model 0). This is followed by five models that 
test the effect of including specific attitudinal 
or behavioural measures to the base model 
(Models I-V). Finally, we run a fully specified 
model that includes the socio-demographic and 
all the additional indictors (Model VI). In each of 
these ordered logistic models, we present the 
proportional Odds Ratios (OR).40  
Our base model (Model 0) confirms the 
earlier result that virtually none of the socio-
demographic attributes is a statistically 
significant predictor of the way South Africans 
assess the policing of protest. Specifically, the 
model indicates that there is no evidence of an 
age, gender, race, marital status, employment 
status, or educational effect informing such 
evaluations. Political party identification was 
also included in the model. Using support 
for the ruling party as the reference group, 
supporting an opposition party was not 
found to be a significant determinant in this 
model. This finding holds true even after other 
variables are added in subsequent models in 
the table. Geography matters to some degree, 
with residents of informal settlements more 
inclined than those in formal urban areas to 
report lower policing effectiveness scores. This 
may partly be owing to a greater likelihood 
that respondents have participated in protest 
action, and by extension that they have more 
exposure on average to public order policing. 
Provincially, those living in Limpopo and the 
Northern Cape were significantly more likely 
to offer more favourable views of the manner 
in which protests are being policed. The Odds 
Ratio is lowest among residents of North West 
province, but this narrowly misses out on being 
a statistically significant finding when controlling 
for other variables. The findings observed in the 
base model remain largely unchanged once 
other attitudinal and behavioural measures are 
included in models I – VI. 
In Model I, recent participation in disruptive or 
violent protest is added as a variable together 
with the socio-demographic attributes. This 
behavioural measure is based on whether 
South Africans report having engaged in one, 
both or neither of the two types of protest in 
the five years prior to being interviewed, and 
is accordingly scaled on a 0 to 2 scale. The 
results show that protest participation does not 
have a significant influence on how respondents 
rate the performance of the police in policing 
incidents of protest. Alternate formulations 
of the protest participation indicators, such 
as accommodating more distant protest 
behaviour, peaceful actions, and testing 
out separate disruptive and violent protest 
behaviour measures in the model, also failed 
to produce statistically significant results. This 
is an important finding, since one might have 
assumed that exposure to public order policing 
through direct participation in disruptive or 
violent protest might lend itself towards more 
critical views on the policing of protest. It 
nonetheless appears that engagement in such 
forms of protest does not predispose individuals 
to adopt a particular outlook in their views of the 
police that is characteristically distinct from that 
held by the rest of the public. 
We were also interested in determining whether 
respondents’ views of the general image and 
perceived effectiveness of disruptive and 
violent protest action had any bearing on their 
evaluations of the policing of protest. These 
measures are more fully examined in their 
own right in the article by Bohler-Muller and 
colleagues in this special issue. The survey 
included separate measures on whether 
respondents tend to regard peaceful, disruptive 
and violent protest action in a positive or 
negative light, with responses captured on 
a 7-point scale ranging between ‘extremely 
negative’ and ‘extremely positive’. For analytical 
purposes, we created an index focusing on the 
image of disruptive and violent action, which 
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was constructed by averaging together the 
scores for the two indicators, which retains 
the original 1–7 negative to positive scaling. 
Similarly, the survey fielded questions on the 
effectiveness of the three types of protest, 
using a 7-point scale ranging from ‘extremely 
unsuccessful’ to ‘extremely successful’. We 
constructed an index of the effectiveness of 
disruptive and violent actions by again averaging 
the two constituent items, with higher scores 
continuing to represent greater perceived 
effectiveness of these actions. The testing of 
these attitudinal measures as predictors of 
evaluations of public order policing is presented 
in models II and III respectively. Both the image 
and perceived effectiveness of disruptive 
and violent protest action are not significant 
factors in explaining public assessments of 
performance in policing protest, as was also 
observed with participation in protest action. 
In Model IV, we concentrate on the 
relationship between views of the policing 
of protest and the perceived acceptability 
of the use of force by police in responding 
to protests. In this instance, we find that the 
justifiability of the use of force in policing 
protest emerges as a significant predictor. 
Those who view the use of force as never 
or only sometimes justifiable tend to provide 
the SAPS with lower performance scores in 
terms of their handling of protests, compared 
to those who view the use of force as always 
justifiable. Even those respondents who were 
unsure about their position on the use of force 
tended to offer significantly lower evaluative 
scores relative to those viewing such force 
as always permissible when responding to 
protest. This remains the strongest single 
effect based on the various indicators that we 
tested in our analysis. 
Table 3: Ordered logistic regression of the effectiveness of the policing of protest, 2016
Model 0 Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI
OR OR OR OR OR OR OR
Age 1.010 1.011 1.013 1.012 1.005 1.012 1.006
Age squared 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Female 1.157 1.168 1.152 1.151 1.115 1.185 1.134
Race (ref=Black African)
Coloured 1.141 1.150 1.143 1.001 1.087 1.072 0.949
Indian / Asian 0.863 0.878 0.791 0.800 0.891 0.906 0.792
White 1.557* 1.573* 1.537* 1.451 1.255 1.504* 1.173
Employment status
Unemployed 0.913 0.906 0.897 0.909 0.920 0.839 0.849
Pensioner 1.491 1.489 1.500 1.456 1.457 1.258 1.203
Student/learner 0.770 0.760 0.797 0.781 0.758 0.714 0.709
Labour inactive 1.187 1.182 1.223 1.201 1.048 0.999 0.920
Other 0.514* 0.515* 0.513* 0.520* 0.425** 0.392** 0.347***
Marital status
Separated, divorced or 
widowed 0.936 0.936 0.947 0.940 0.970 0.963 0.983
Never married 0.939 0.936 0.943 0.954 0.876 0.973 0.908
Continued on page 74
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Model 0 Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI
Years of schooling 0.988 0.987 0.985 0.987 0.976 0.983 0.974
Province (ref=Western Cape)
Eastern Cape 1.308 1.304 1.330 1.172 1.100 1.136 0.945
Northern Cape 1.935** 1.929** 1.942** 1.775** 1.622* 1.799** 1.501
Free State 1.438 1.442 1.439 1.213 1.187 1.166 0.919
KwaZulu-Natal 1.068 1.053 1.104 0.961 0.996 0.919 0.844
North West 0.673 0.671 0.672 0.569* 0.682 0.679 0.615
Gauteng 1.128 1.112 1.150 1.025 1.129 1.118 1.080
Mpumalanga 1.105 1.104 1.102 0.958 0.945 0.894 0.789
Limpopo 2.064** 2.067** 2.059** 1.794* 2.279** 1.735* 1.812*
Geographic location (ref=formal urban)
Urban informal 0.572* 0.567 0.590 0.560* 0.590 0.557* 0.539*
Rural traditional authority 
areas 1.181 1.191 1.187 1.170 1.158 1.048 1.059
Rural farms 1.540* 1.542* 1.442 1.471 1.715** 1.437 1.455
Party identification (ref=ANC)
Democratic Alliance 0.937 0.935 0.920 0.875 0.807 0.946 0.820
Other political parties 0.781 0.784 0.781 0.763 0.691 0.960 0.819
No party 1.227 1.194 1.124 1.106 1.118 1.325 1.158
Undeclared / undecided 1.557* 1.566* 1.561* 1.540* 1.346 1.661* 1.451*
Participation in protest in last 
5 years … 1.022 … … … … 0.897
Image of disruptive & violent 
action … … 0.938 … … … 1.045
Effectiveness of disruptive & 
violent action … … … 0.912 … … 0.918
Use of force in policing protest 
(ref=always justified)
Justified in some cases … … … … 0.498** … 0.539**
This is never justified … … … … 0.107*** … 0.133***
(Do not know) … … … … 0.236*** … 0.276***
Overall confidence in the 
police … … … … … 1.853*** 1.672***
/cut1 -0.922 -0.917 -1.095 -1.379 -2.759 0.570 -1.654
/cut2 0.687 0.698 0.526 0.246 -0.919 2.352 0.331
/cut3 2.859 2.859 2.680 2.406 1.459 4.669 2.806
Pseudo R2 0.0214 0.0220 0.0227 0.0234 0.0893 0.0708 0.1251
Number of observations 2789 2783 2756 2728 2776 2758 2687
Note: OR = odds ratio. The dependent variable is a reversed scaled version of the performance of the policing of protest measures, with 0=‘not at all well’, 1=‘not very well’, 
2=‘fairly well’ and 3=‘very well’. ‘Don’t know’ responses were omitted. Statistical significance is represented as follows: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
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In approaching the study, we were keen to 
examine the extent to which one’s general 
confidence in the police as an authority has 
a bearing on appraisals of specific areas of 
performance, such as public order policing. 
Our hypothesis was that those who exhibit 
distrust of the police would on average tend to 
voice more critical views on performance, and 
vice versa. Indeed, this proves to be the case, 
as demonstrated in Model V. Our measure of 
overall police confidence was initially designed 
as part of a European Social Survey module on 
confidence in the criminal justice system, which 
has been fielded in the SASAS series in recent 
years. The question is phrased as follows: 
‘Taking into account all the things the police 
are expected to do, would you say they are 
doing a good job or a bad job?’, with responses 
captured using a five-point scale ranging from a 
‘very good job’ to a ‘very bad job’. For modelling 
purposes, we reversed the scale, so that higher 
values indicate greater confidence levels. The 
appeal of this item is that it is phrased in a 
similar way to our policing of protest item. We 
also tested the effect of an alternate police 
confidence measure that explicitly asks about 
levels of trust in police, using a standard five-
point trust scale. Based on this specification, the 
finding remains the same.  
Lastly, Model VI runs the analysis with all the 
different indicators included. The findings 
from the preceding models remain largely 
unchanged. The socio-demographic measures 
continue to be insignificant factors, with only 
minor geographic effects present. Limpopo 
residents continue to express higher than 
average performance ratings, although a 
similar pattern in the Northern Cape loses its 
salience once other attitudinal and behavioural 
variables are controlled for. South Africans living 
in informal settlements continue to exhibit a 
more disapproving stance than those in other 
geographic locales on how protests are being 
policed. The perceived justifiability of the use 
of force, in addressing protest, in addition to 
overall levels of confidence in the police retain 
their positive association with protest policing 
evaluations. Past participation in violent and 
disruptive protest actions, together with the 
image and perceived effectiveness of such 
protest, continues to register no discernible 
influence in appraising SAPS performance.
Discussion 
Our examination of public attitudes towards 
protest policing has shown that, on the whole, 
performance evaluations tend to be fairly 
negative. This perspective is commonly shared 
across various demographic and class traits, 
though appreciable geographic variation is 
nonetheless apparent. These results confound 
expectations of lower levels of confidence in 
police crowd management activities among 
more vulnerable and marginalised segments 
of society, which indicates that the so-called 
‘rebellion of the poor’ in protest behaviour is not 
resolutely manifest in the mind of the public.41 
This is an interesting finding that will require 
further testing, using data on a broader set of 
concepts and constructs.
In considering other factors beyond socio-
demographic markers that might help explain 
the way citizens appraise protest policing, 
the lack of statistical significance in relation 
to measures such as recent participation in 
protest action as well as support for and the 
perceived effectiveness of disruptive and violent 
protest actions, is particularly striking. It signifies 
that one’s experience of engaging in protest 
action – and by extension first-hand exposure 
to the manner in which the police approach 
crowd management – does not exert a sizable 
influence on one’s view of police performance 
in undertaking such duties. Furthermore, one’s 
general predisposition towards disruptive and 
violent actions also does not play a role in 
structuring expressed levels of confidence in 
the policing of protest action. So, an aversion 
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to more disruptive and violent forms of protest 
does not automatically translate into a more 
sanguine view of public order policing. 
What clearly seems to matter, though, is the 
public’s position in relation to the acceptability 
of the use of force in maintaining public order. 
The more one deems it justifiable for officers to 
use violence in particular situations, the more 
inclined one is to provide a positive evaluation of 
the policing of protest. For approximately a third 
of South Africans, the use of force by the police 
in the context of protest is deemed to be wholly 
unacceptable. This is associated with acutely 
diminished confidence in the police’s handling 
of protest. It may be that for this segment of 
society, the unfairness and brutality that have 
characterised the policing of protests have 
violated their notion of ‘good’ policing and the 
values of fair treatment, appropriate conduct 
and respect that maintain a sense of legitimacy, 
trust and confidence.42 By contrast, for the 
smaller minority (one in eight, or 13%) that 
considers the use of non-lethal physical force as 
always justifiable, levels of confidence in public 
order policing is more than four times higher. 
This suggests, somewhat controversially, that 
the use of force to control protesters may serve 
to promote or reinforce police legitimacy for 
some South Africans. This would imply that, for 
this group, a less aggressive or violent approach 
to public order policing might bring into question 
the legitimacy of, and confidence in, the 
police. Although our study does not provide 
a comprehensive account of the attitudes 
towards police use of force in protest situations, 
international evidence points to aggressive 
personality traits, a tendency towards right-
wing authoritarianism, and a stronger social 
dominance orientation as possible factors 
associated with a more accepting stance on the 
excessive use of force.43 This may be due to a 
desire to control social threats, promote security 
and help maintain current power hierarchies.44 
The dominant public response to the use of 
force question remains one that regards the 
violent policing of protest as justifiable in certain 
circumstances. Accounting for slightly less 
than half of the adult population, this position 
is associated with a more ambiguous position 
in respect of confidence in protest policing, 
with virtually equivalent shares expressing 
favourable and unfavourable views. The 
circumstances under which such tactics might 
be tolerable cannot be ascertained from our 
data, but the calculus is likely to involve a range 
of factors, from the behavioural repertoires of 
the protesters to whether the police response 
has firstly exhausted negotiation and all 
other options involving a minimal amount of 
force. The ambiguity in public order policing 
confidence ratings might also partially reflect 
a sense of unease about whether the police 
response in managing protests falls within the 
ambit of reasonable or justifiable use of force, 
or not. The former group is likely to view force 
as a constituent element of effective policing, 
but regard the application of force in crowd 
management incidents as highly conditional and 
contextual. In relation to the preceding points, it 
is worth noting that the definition and accepted 
normative limits of ‘police violence’ may tend to 
vary over time, context and ideological outlook.  
Conclusion
The processes of transformation in public 
order policing in South Africa since the 
early 1990s have been complex and non-
linear. An initial political commitment to 
professional, democratic public order policing 
was subsequently followed by a period of 
organisational degradation and leadership 
problems. Together with the prioritisation 
afforded to the fight against crime, this led to 
the relative neglect of public order policing for a 
number of years. However, in response to the 
rising incidence of public protest in the country, 
the tide has turned and public order policing 
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has received renewed attention. Concerns have 
nonetheless been expressed about whether this 
recent development has been accompanied by 
an ethos emphasising a ‘hard-edged’ approach 
involving more forceful policing practices, rather 
than the application of minimum force.45 The 
subsequent rise in reported cases involving 
excessive use of force and police fatalities 
during acts of demonstration, together with the 
events in Marikana, have raised fundamental 
questions about the manner in which protest is 
being policed in our constitutional democracy. 
From a public opinion perspective, it has also 
led to questions about the implications of such 
developments on the perceived legitimacy of 
the police. 
As a response to the policing failures in dealing 
with public protest, including the escalation in 
the number of protesters killed by police over 
the 2010-2014 period,46 there have since 2014 
been signs of a distinct retreat at the senior 
political and police level from the strong-arm 
public order policing approach that typified the 
early 2010s.47 This has involved something of 
a cyclical return to the priorities of the mid-to-
late 1990s, a period characterised by deliberate 
attempts to move public order policing away 
from the apartheid state’s repression of 
demonstration through brutally forceful policing. 
Developments include the return in name of 
the Public Order Policing (POP) unit with a 
primary emphasis on crowd management, 
a commitment to reinvesting in public order 
capacity in terms of both training and numbers 
of police members, and the introduction of a 
National Instruction on Crowd Management 
during public gatherings and demonstrations. 
The latter restates the importance of a well-
trained, resourced and command-driven unit 
that displays utmost restraint, and adheres to 
strict guidelines governing the use of force as 
a tactic of last resort and in compliance with 
legislative and constitutional imperatives.48 
The apparent political will that currently exists 
for a new organisational model of public order 
policing represents an opportune moment to 
critically engage with and shape the future 
approach to this specialised form of policing.49 
The choices that are made in this regard will 
indelibly influence the next generation of police–
citizen relations. Based on our survey results, 
we contend that a continued reliance by the 
police on disproportionate and excessive force, 
and a tendency to resort quickly to the use of 
rubber bullets and teargas as controlling tactics 
in dealing with protest, may provoke a further 
withdrawal of support for the use of force. This, 
in turn, would further diminish overall confidence 
in the ability to police protest actions. This is 
of concern, since public trust and confidence 
are generally recognised as a key component 
of ensuring effective, democratic policing.50 
Organisational transformation is a necessary 
but insufficient part of promoting positive and 
enduring change. It also requires an appreciation 
of the socio-economic and political context in 
which protest action and public order policing 
are occurring.51 Rather than constraining the 
right to protest and demonstrate by means of 
repressive and controlling actions, the policing 
approach to crowd management should aim 
to assist and facilitate peaceful protest that 
enables those taking to the streets to effectively 
convey their message to the elites. As Tait and 
Marks eloquently stated several years ago in 
this journal, ‘ultimately what we want are public 
order police officers who are deeply conscious 
of citizens’ constitutional and other rights, are 
firm and impartial, and operate in ways that 
are professional. The best we can hope for is a 
contextually and situationally appropriate South 
African model of public order policing.’52 
Study limitations
This article has contributed to our knowledge 
of South African public opinion on police 
performance in handling protest action. 
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However, the analysis is not without limitations. 
There is currently no available trend data 
on attitudes to the issues under discussion. 
As a result, we do not know how stable or 
variant such attitudes are, and how sensitive 
these attitudes are to contextual events. In 
addition, we only have single-item measures of 
satisfaction with protest policing performance 
and the acceptability of use of force by the 
police. The use of single-item measures may 
fail to capture important nuances in public 
opinion on protest action. Consequently, it is not 
possible to say with confidence what motivates 
the observed link between attitudes towards the 
use of force during protests and evaluations of 
police performance in controlling protest. Other 
important questions also remain unresolved. 
For example, what types of force used by the 
police to control protests would the public be 
comfortable with? Moreover, public attitudes 
towards the use of force by police may vary, 
depending on the type of protesters under 
consideration, for instance students versus 
workers. Our use of force measure focused only 
on retaliatory responses to violent protest (i.e. 
protesters throwing stones at police) and we 
might arrive at a different or more nuanced set 
of results if a range of examples of excessive 
and reasonable use of force are provided.53 The 
role of the media in informing the understanding 
and preferences that the public has in relation to 
protest and the policing of such events has also 
not been examined in the article, owing again 
to the absence of relevant questions in the 
survey instrument. To address these limitations, 
future public opinion research needs to utilise a 
more comprehensive set of questions on police 
performance in handling protest action, as well 
as on other relevant contextual factors. 
To comment on this article visit 
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
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